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SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS IN CALIFORNIA:
EXPANSION OF MUNICIPAL POWER
In order to meet the tremendous population growth that Cali-
fornia has experienced during the last few decades, large quantities of
open space land have been privately developed. The private devel-
oper's prime motivation has been the maximization of profits. De-
velopments based primarily on such motivation may tend to ignore
human needs and result in a detriment to overall community develop-
ment. As a result, a strong public interest has emerged in preventing
haphazard development of communities by private developers. There
has been increasing political pressure on state governments to provide
some form of local land use controls which would promote the or-
derly and efficient use of land in growing communities. Because of
the large amounts of land that are consumed in subdivision develop-
ment, particular emphasis has been placed on the passage of legisla-
tion which would allow control and regulation of residential develop-
ment.
A necessary concomitant to the need for alleviation of popula-
tion congestion caused by the proliferation of residential subdivisions
has been the need for open space to accommodate the influx of new
residents. This, in turn, has created a need to preserve open spaces
for local parks and recreational areas. Ironically, the subdivision which
generates the need for more open space is often the very cause of the
reduction in available open space.
To ameliorate the impact of subdivisions, advocates of orderly
community development have recently been urging that some provi-
sion for neighborhood park and recreational facilities be incorporated
into plans for subdivision developments through the medium of com-
munity land use regulations. In response to this public pressure, state
legislatures have enacted enabling legislation permitting municipali-
ties to control and regulate the development of their communities and to
shift certain of the increased costs of public facilities created by the
new subdivisions, such as streets and sewers, to the private developer-
and through him to the home buyer.
The purpose of such legislation is to allow municipalities to utilize
the police power to control and regulate the design and improvement
of subdivisions under a long range scheme for community develop-
ment. Requiring city approval of a proposed map of a subdivision
from a developer is the usual device used to insure compliance with
the municipality's overall development plan. Under the authority of
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the enabling legislation, municipalities generally enact local ordinances
which impose certain requirements on private developers.'
California's approach to the problem of controlling subdivision
development is typical of modem legislation. The basic enabling leg-
islation is embodied in the Subdivision Map Act (SMA),2 which ap-
plies exclusively to subdivisions.' Under the SMA a subdivision is de-
fined as real property, divided for the purpose of sale or lease, into
five or more parcels, but exclusive of apartments, businesses and indus-
tries.' Control and enforcement of the design and improvement of
subdivisions is vested in governing bodies of cities and counties,5 and
they are required to enact local legislation to implement the various
provisions of the SMA.' Local legislation, however, is limited to that
which is specifically or impliedly contained in the SMA.7
1. For a general discussion of such subdivision regulations see 3 R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; 6 E. McQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 24.01-.47 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLIN];
8-8a id. §§ 25.01-.361; 11 id. §§ 32.01-.123, .133, 33.01-.80; 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY 859-73, 936 (Rohan ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as POWELL]; A.
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING (3d ed. 1966); Bowden, Article XXVIII
-Opening the Door to Open Space Control, 1 PAC. L.J. 461 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Bowden]; Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth
on the Urban Fringe, 1961 WIs. L. REv. 370 [hereinafter cited as Cutler]; Hanna, Sub-
divisions: Conditions Imposed by Local Governments, 6 SANTA CLARA LAW. 172 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Hanna]; 1 M. Heyman, Powers (prepared for San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Development Comm'n, Apr. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Heyman];
Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality oj Imposing Increased Community Costs on
New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Heyman & Gilhool]; Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision
Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Johnston]; Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 405 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Reps & Smith]; Taylor, Current Problems in
California Subdivision Control, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 344 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Taylor].
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11500-641 (West 1964), as amended, (Supp.
1971).
3. "Subdivision" refers to any real property, improved or unimproved, or any
portion thereof shown on the county tax roll as a unit or series of contiguous units.
Id. § 11535(a) (West Supp. 1971).
4. It is also inapplicable to: trailer parks; mineral, oil or gas leases; certain par-
cels less than five acres which abut upon a public street or highway; parcels where
each lot has a gross area of twenty acres or more; and cemeteries. Id.
5. Id. § 11525. Violation of the SMA is a misdemeanor and penal sanctions
are provided. Id. § 11541 (West 1964). Any conveyance made contrary to the SMA,
where it is applicable, is voidable. Id. § 11540.
6. The legislation must control the design and improvement of subdivisions.
Id. § 11525 (West Supp. 1971). "Design" and "improvement" are specifically defined
in id. §§ 11510, 11511 (West 1964), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
7. Keller v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957),
construing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11526 (West 1954), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
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A developer is required to first file a tentative map of his pro-
posed subdivision for approval.8 The SMA sets out the mechan-
ics for granting map approval,9 and the local ordinances and resolu-
tions specify the conditions which must be met by the developer. In
the event a developer is dissatisfied with any of the preconditions im-
posed by the municipality, there is a grievance procedure available
through local hearings and, if necessary, through appeals to the
courts.' 0
The original SMA included requirements for dedication of land for
streets.11 Provisions were subsequently added to the SMA authoriz-
ing payment of fees for sewers and drainage facilities 2 and dedica-
tion of land for schools. 3 A conspicuous omission from these re-
quirements was a provision enabling local authorities to require dedi-
cation of land for parks and recreational facilities. Municipalities had
Also, a fee may be collected to defray the administrative costs of processing the sub-
divider's maps. Id. § 11529 (West Supp. 1971).
8. It is unlawful to sell or lease or to contract to sell or lease any land within
the proposed subdivision until a final map fully complies with the SMA and local
ordinances and has been duly recorded or filed in the county recorder's office. Id.
§ 11538 (West 1964).
9. Separate sections provide for the administration of: tentative maps, id.
88 11550-55 (West 1964), as amended, (Supp. 1971); final maps, id. § 11565-68; par-
cel maps, id. § 11575-80 (West Supp. 1971); certificates and acknowledgments on
final maps, id. § 11585-93 (West 1964), as amended, (Supp. 1971); taxes and assess-
ments, id. H§ 11600-05; final approvals, id. § 11610-19; recording, id. H§ 11625-29;
and revocation of approvals, id. H§ 11640-41 (West 1964).
10. A municipality may appoint an advisory agency to make investigations and
reports regarding proposed divisions of land. Id. § 11509 (West 1964), as amended,
(Supp. 1971). It may also appoint an appeal board to hear grievances from actions of
the advisory agency. Id. § 11512 (West Supp. 1971). An advisory agency has fifty
days from the date of filing of a tentative map to report on the map and that report shall
approve, conditionally approve or disapprove a proposed map. The governing body has
ten days to act on this report. If dissatisfied with the action of the advisory agency, the
subdivider has fifteen days to appeal to the appeal board which must hold a public hear-
ing on the matter within fifteen days, or at its next succeeding regular meeting, from
the date of appeal. The appeal board has seven days from conclusion of the hearing
to declare its findings either sustaining, modifying, rejecting or overruling any action
of the advisory agency. If still dissatisfied, the subdivider has fifteen days to appeal
directly to the governing body. The governing body has fifteen days, or until its next
succeeding regular meeting, to grant a hearing and seven more days after the conclusion
of the hearing to declare its findings. Id. § 11552. If, after this possible 4 month
period, the subdivider desires to appeal to the courts, he has 6 months in which to file
his appeal. Id. § 11525.1.
11. Cal. Stat. 1943, ch. 128, § 1, at 869, codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 11551 (West 1964).
12. Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1920, § 1, at 4505, codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 11543.5 (West 1964), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
13. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 1961, § 1, at 4489, codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 11525.2 (West Supp. 1971).
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attempted to impose park and recreation requirements on developers
as a condition precedent to approval of a map. Such attempts had
been unsuccessful because there was no specific provision for this au-
thority in the SMA. 14 The legislature was prompted to remedy this
situation, and in 1965 enacted section 11546 of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code as part of the SMA.'5 In its present form, this provi-
sion invests municipalities with the authority to require the dedication
of land, or pay a fee in lieu thereof, or a combination of both, for park
purposes as a precondition to approval of a subdivision map. The stat-
ute authorizes these exactions16 if the following conditions are met:
(1) the city has definite standards for determining the amount of the
exaction; (2) the exaction is used only for the purpose of providing
park or recreational facilities to serve the subdivision; (3) there is a
general plan for city growth which contains a recreational element
with definite principles and standards for park and recreational facili-
ties; (4) the amount of the exaction bears a reasonable relationship to
the use of the park and recreational facilities by the future inhabitants
of the subdivision; and (5) the city specifies when development of the
facilities will begin.' 7
Pursuant to section 11546, the city of Walnut Creek enacted an
ordinance, 8 passed resolutions, 9 and drew up a comprehensive park
plan. 20  The basic scheme outlined by the Walnut Creek legislation pro-
vided for an overall city plan depicting existing and future park sites on a
city map. 2' The city plan included provisions for neighborhood
parks, community and special parks, and other recreational facilities;2"
however, exactions from developers were limited to neighborhood and
community parks serving the subdivision.23 The plan established a
14. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957). CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11510, as originally enacted, Cal. Stat. 1943, ch. 128, § I, at
866, defined "design" of subdivisions without any provisions for parks.
15. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 1809, § 2, at 4183. The same legislation also amended
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11510 to add the following: "'Design' also includes land to
be dedicated for park or recreational purposes." Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 1809, § 1, at 4183.
16. The term "exactions" is used in this note generically to include dedication
of land, payment of fees in lieu thereof, or a combination of both.
17. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11546(b) to (f) (West Supp. 1971). Subdivision
(a) provided that the local ordinance had to be in effect for thirty days prior to the
filing of the tentative map of the subdivision. Subdivision (g) provided that only fees
could be required of subdivisions containing fifty parcels or less. Section 11546 does
not apply to industrial subdivisions.
18. WALNUT CREEK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-1.516 (1967).
19. Walnut Creek, Cal., Res. 1883 (1964); 2225 (1967).
20. Walnut Creek, Cal., Long Range Park and Recreation Plan (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Park Plan].
21. Walnut Creek, Cal., Res. 1883 (1964).
22. Park Plan, supra note 20, at 3.
23. WALNUT CREEK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-1.516(b)(1), (2) (1967).
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standard of two and one half acres per thousand residents as the mini-
mum requirement for parks,24 and each developer was required, before
his map was approved, to dedicate land for parks, or pay fees in lieu
thereof, on the basis of the number of residents expected to be brought
into the community as a result of the subdivision.25
The developer was required to dedicate land when the city had
already designated a neighborhood park site within the proposed sub-
division, if the slope, topography, geology and generl surroundings of
the site were suitable for the park purposes.2 6 If dedication of land
was found to be impossible, impractical or undesirable, the developer
was required to pay a fee in lieu thereof in an amount equal to the fair
market value of the land that would have otherwise been dedicated. 27
A combination of land and fees was required when only a portion of the
neighborhood park site on the city map was within the proposed sub-
division.28 Any fees collected under the plan were to be used only
for the purpose of providing park or recreational facilities to serve
the subdivision.29  The parks were to be developed by the city as they
became necessary; 0 however, upon approval of the subdivision map,
the city was required to specify when development of the park would
begin.3 1 Subdividers and residents of the subdivision were to be con-
sulted before development of the park in order to insure that local
needs were met.3 2  At the option of the city, credit could be granted
to the developer for park and recreational facilities which he had in-
cluded in his subdivision plan, provided the developer would guaran-
tee that such land would be permanently maintained for such pur-
poses.38
The constitutionality of section 11546 and the Walnut Creek leg-
islation was recently challenged in Associated Home Builddrs, Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek.s4 The plaintiffs alternatively asserted that the
24. Walnut Creek, Cal., Res. 2225 at 3 (1967) (3d "whereas" clause); Park
Plan, supra note 20, at 3.
25. WALNUT CREEK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-1.516(b) (1967).
26. Id. § 10-1.516(b)(1); Walnut Creek, Cal., Res. 2225, at 1 (1967).
27. The "in lieu" fees were required if no park or recreational facility was desig-
nated within the proposed subdivision, or if dedication of land was not feasible and a
neighborhood or community park was within a 3/4 mile radius of the subdivision.
WALNUT CREEK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-1.516(b)(2)(aa) (1967).
28. Walnut Creek, Cal., Res. 2225, at 3 (1967).
29. WALNUT CREEK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-1.516(b)(2)(cc) (1967).
30. Walnut Creek, Cal., Res. 2225, at 3 (1967).
31. WALNUT CREEK, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-1.516(d) (1967).
32. Walnut Creek, Cal., Res. 2225, at 3 (1967).
33. WALNUT CREEK, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10-1.516(c) (1967); Walnut Creek,
Cal., Res. 2225, at 2 (1967).
34. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 92
S. Ct. 202 (1971).
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Walnut Creek legislation, even if deemed to be constitutional, failed
to comply with the provisions of section 11546. The California Su-
preme Court answered the challenges by unanimously upholding both
the state enabling act and the local implementing legislation. Although
there have been similar challenges against subdivision exactions in other
jurisdictions, this is the first time exactions for park purposes have
been challenged in California as an unreasonable exercise of the police
power. More importantly, however, the court in Associated gave a
much broader constitutional interpretation to the requirements that may
be imposed on developers than have the decisions of courts in other
jurisdictions. Much of the prior authority relied upon by the court in
Associated does not appear to warrant the broad construction which
has been given section 11546 and the Walnut Creek legislation. This
note will review some of the authority relied upon by the court in As-
sociated and will analyze the reasons given by the court for its deci-
sion.35 This note will also compare the court's decision with decisions
in other jurisdictions.
Judicial Approaches to the Constitutionality
of Subdivision Exactions
Characterization of exactions as "subdivision controls" allows
them to be justified as a proper exercise of the police power.3" The
exactions are primarily viewed as regulatory in nature because they
come into operation only when a developer decides to subdivide his
land.37 The proposition that developers do not have an absolute right
to subdivide their land is generally accepted; 38 most authorities con-
clude that subdividing is a privilege, and that the dedication of land,
or payment of fees, is deemed to be done voluntarily by the developer
to gain approval of his subdivision map.39  Under this theory, the sub-
35. This note is necessarily confined to a discussion of the reasonableness of sub-
division exactions. The term "reasonableness" is also used in a broader context, exer-
cise of the regulatory power in general. Courts have discussed it under four rubrics:
"arbitrariness," "confiscation," "discrimination," and "taking." See generally Bowden,
supra note 1, at 474-92; Heyman, supra note 1, at 11-48; Heyman & Gilhool, supra
note 1, at 1124-30.
36. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 19.25. But cf. Hanna, supra note 1, at
184. See note 40 infra.
37. Cf. Keizer v. Adams, 2 Cal. 3d 976, 979, 471 P.2d 983, 985, 88 Cal. Rptr.
183, 185 (1970); Pratt v. Adams, 229 Cal. App. 2d 602, 606, 40 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508
(1964); Taylor, supra note 1, at 346.
38. See Bowden, supra note 1, at 476; Heyman, Planning and the Constitution:
The Great 'Property Rights' Fallacy, CRY CALIFORNIA, Summer 1968, 29, 33 (how far
regulation can go is basically a political question).
39. See, e.g., Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 472, 217
N.W. 58, 59 (1928); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25,
33, 394 P.2d 182, 187 (1964); ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 19.25. See Hanna, supra
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divider's interest in the land is viewed as purely economic; that is, he
is merely producing a product.40 In return for the profit he expects to
make, the developer can be subjected to reasonable regulation to in-
sure that he will develop his land in a manner designed to minimize the
economic impact on the entire community. 41
Subdivision exactions viewed in this manner allow a court to con-
centrate on two constitutional issues which routinely arise in litigation
concerning such exactions. First, the court must determine whether
the purpose of the exaction is within the constitutional objectives of
the police power; that is, whether it is calculated to promote the public
welfare. Secondly, the court must determine whether the exaction in
question is reasonable; that is, whether the method used reasonably
tends to serve the stated purpose and whether it is within the consti-
tutional limitations for the exercise of the regulatory power.42
Whether the purpose of the exaction is within the constitutional
scope of the police power has not caused any serious problems in the
courts. In general, there is a judicial presumption in favor of the va-
lidity of zoning legislation, 43 and a marked deference to legislative
judgment, especially in California, concerning what is a worthy public
objective.44 The most common land dedication requirements have been
note 1, at 184 (questions the "voluntariness" of the dedication); Johnston, supra note
1, at 876-85 (same).
40. "Clearly, the nonsubdivider is entitled to compensation for his land when
it is converted to street, park, or other public use. Why should the subdivider be ex-
cluded from this guarantee? . . . Inhere is an elementary but vital distinction between
developers and other landowners. The subdivider is a manufacturer, processer, and
marketer of a product; land is but one of his raw materials. In subdivision control dis-
putes, the developer is not defending hearth and home against the king's intrusion, but
simply attempting to maximize his profits from the sale of a finished product. As
applied to him, subdivision control exactions are actually business regulations." John-
ston, supra note 1, at 922-23.
41. 'The statutes in most states permit at least the cost of on site improvements
to be charged either to the developer, the new homeowners (through benefit assess-
ments), or to the entire community. However, the general practice in an area of
rapid growth is to insist that an increasingly higher proportion of both on site and off
site costs be borne by the developer, and in turn passed on to the new home buyer for
whom such improvements are created." Cutler, supra note 1, at 385.
42. ANDERsoN, supra note 1, at § 7.01; Bowden, supra note 1, at 474; Heyman
& Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1122.
43. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370
P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
44. "In some states, notably California, courts defer substantially to legislative
judgments [citing Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 202 P.2d 38,
43 (1949)]. . . . To the extent that the judicial attitude is one of deference to
legislative determinations, the probability of negative judicial action is lessened and the
probability that the regulatory proposal will be found valid is increased. . . . In
addition, an attitude of judicial deference leads to greater legislative experimentation.
Thus, California, in many details, has planning legislation more advanced that [sic]
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for streets, and exactions for this purpose have routinely been held
permissible by the courts since streets are clearly related to the orderly
development of a community. Similarly, no serious contention as to
the constitutionality of dedication requirements for water, sewers, side-
walks and drainage systems has been made.45 The vital nature of these
requirements has apparently been obvious to developers, residents and
the courts.
Dedication requirements for parks, on the other hand, have only
recently come under scrutiny. The vital nature of parks to a com-
munity is not as readily apparent as the need for streets, water or sew-
ers. The amount of land required for parks is generally greater than
that required for roads or sewer lines. The topography generally nec-
essary for parks insures that the dedicated land will be prime subdivi-
sion real estate.4 6 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in an early case,
decided that although parks were desirable, they were not necessary in
the same sense as streets, and land exactions for parks were therefore
held not to be justified under the police power. 47  Since that opinion,
other states. It is very unlikely that California courts will abandon this attitude of
deference in view of its long and well established history in California case law."
Heyman, supra note 1, at 9-10.
"Judicial deference [in California] is most notable to legislative definitions of
worthy public objectives and legislative choice of the means . . .best designed to ac-
complish them. One should note that this judicial attitude has been evidenced in cases
involving regulations adopted by city councils and county boards of supervisors which
often must make decisions based on scanty technical data and under conditions where
a rather narrow range of interests tend to be represented." Id. at 17.
45. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1133, 1136-41. But cf. Reps & Smith,
supra note 1, at 410 (schools should be treated differently).
46. "The requirement that a subdivider set aside land for parks has at least two
features which distinguish it from similar requirements with respect to streets, and
those which relate to water, sewer, and drainage systems. First, the amount of land
which is involved may be greater, and may be more obviously a salable portion of
the tract. Second, the vital nature of the streets, sewers, waterlines, and drainage fa-
cilities is more obvious to the developer, the purchasers, and the courts than is true of
parks and playgrounds. Perhaps a third factor should be added. With or without sub-
division controls, a developer planning and opening a new subdivision must show
streets, sewers, etc. These are a traditional as well as an essential part of a new
neighborhood. Neighborhood park space is less common; it serves a public interest
which has been ignored." ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 19.39.
47. Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951), where the
court asked the question: "Shall this principle relating to streets, which are narrow,
well defined and absolutely necessary, be extended to parks and playgrounds which may
be very large and very desirable but not necessary?" Id. at 193, 82 A.2d at 36. And
answered it in the negative noting: "The city is not without a remedy, but it cannot
eat its cake and have its penny too. If it desires plaintiffs' land for a park or play-
ground which it considers desirable or necessary for its future progress, it can readily
and lawfully obtain this land in accordance with the Constitution. . . . All that is
required is that just compensation be paid therefor." Id. at 198, 82 A.2d at 38-39.
[Vol. 23
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however, cases concerning exactions for parks have rarely been chal-
lenged on the ground that the purpose is unrelated to the welfare of the
community; when they have been so challenged, they have been up-
held.4"
Although the constitutionality of using the police power to make
exactions for park purposes is no longer a serious issue, courts have
had more trouble with the second question-the reasonableness of the
exactions. The term "reasonableness" is necessarily an imprecise term
and judicial approaches to its definition in terms of dedication require-
ments have differed.
Ayers: Foundation Case Law
An early landmark California case, Ayers v. City Council of Los
Angeles,49 involved the reasonableness of subdivision exactions. This
decision has provided the foundation for judicial theories in several
other jurisdictions determining the constitutionality of such exactions.
In Ayers the owners of thirteen acres of land adjacent to a main
boulevard in Los Angeles wanted to develop a residential subdivision.
The proposed subdivision was the last one to be developed in the par-
ticular area. The city had previously planned to widen the contiguous
boulevard and had planned to condemn part of this parcel of land to
do so. The developer utilized a cellular design for his proposed subdi-
vision which was the generally adopted method of residential sub-
division in that locality. This design was advantageous to the developer
because it minimized the amount of land required for street purposes,
and it was advantageous to the city because it interfered less with the
free flow of traffic than did other designs. Furthermore, the cellular
design complied with the city's overall neighborhood plan. Ingress and
egress to the subdivision from the boulevard was provided through
tributary streets perpendicular to it.
As a condition to approval of the subdivision map, the city first
required the owner to dedicate a ten foot strip of his land for the pur-
pose of widening the boulevard; secondly, the city required another ten
foot strip of the land for planting of trees to insulate the subdivision
from the boulevard; thirdly, the city required dedication of an eighty
foot strip of land for a street which would cut across the subdivision;
finally, the city required dedication of a small triangular island in or-
48. See, e.g., Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 33,
394 P.2d 182, 187 (1964). "If the legislature thinks it wise to apportion the cost of
increased facilities to new residents whose activities make them necessary, whether for
reasons of fairness, efficiency, or convenience, such a policy, unless palpably arbi-
trary, should not be liable to constitutional invalidation." Heyman & Gilhool, supra
note 1, at 1154.
49. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
der to eliminate an existing traffic hazard which had been created by
the extension of another street at the southern tip of the subdivision.
The subdivider challenged these required dedications, contending
that the city was exercising the power of eminent domain under the
guise of subdivision map proceedings in order to avoid fair payment
for the land taken. The court, in upholding the constitutionality of
the dedications, summarily dismissed this contention:
A sufficient answer is that the proceeding here involved is not one
in eminent domain nor is the city seeking to exercise that power.
It is the petitioner who is seeking to acquire the advantages of lot
subdivision and upon him rests the duty of compliance with rea-
sonable conditions for. . . dedication. . . so as to conform to the
safety and general welfare of the lot owners in the subdivision and
of the public.50
Earlier in the opinion the court had noted:
Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of
fact. . . . In a growing metropolitan area each additional sub-
division adds to the traffic burden. It is no defense to the condi-
tions imposed in a subdivision map proceeding that their fulfill-
ment will incidentally also benefit the city as a whole. Nor is it a
valid objection to say that the conditions contemplate future as
well as more immediate needs. Potential as well as present popu-
lation factors affecting the subdivision and the neighborhood gen-
erally are appropriate for consideration. 51
These statements have been cited by other courts in subsequent
decisions concerning subdivision exactions and have been interpreted
in various ways. The statements by the court appear to suggest that,
under certain circumstances, the city can require the developer to sat-
isfy part of a general public need. In other words, that it is constitu-
tionally permissible, under the police power, to take a little more land
than is required to satisfy the specific needs generated by the subdivi-
sion under the guise of regulation. 2
50. Id. at 42, 207 P.2d at 7 (emphasis added). Commenting on these state-
ments, one commentator noted: "This statement is disappointing. Obviously, the form
in which the proceeding is conducted should not determine applicability of the con-
stitutional guarantee of just compensation. The facile verbalization that the sub-
divider has a duty to comply with 'reasonable conditions' merely obscures the central
problem-how is 'reasonableness' to be determined?" Johnston, supra note 1, at 891.
51. 34 Cal. 2d at 41, 207 P.2d at 7.
52. "Ayers . . . and Bringle v. Board of Supervisors indicate the extent to which
the police power may be employed in restricting land use. They indicate at least two
things. First, a land owner may be compelled to dedicate a part of his property to
public use even if he did not create the need for which the land is sought to be used.
Second, a city may use official sanctions such as building permits, etc., to bargain
with landowners in municipal projects such as street widening." Bowden, supra note 1,
at 482. "[I1n the two leading cases on the question, Ayers . . . and Brouse v. Smith,
one judgment is clearly identifiable. It is permissible to require a landowner to pay
for improvements which are generated by his use of the land whether or not the com-
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When considered in light of the fact situation in Ayers, however,
this latter conclusion is not so clear. For example, the court noted that
the cellular design of the subdivision precluded direct ingress and egress
from the boulevard, and that any other design would have been "out of
harmony with the neighborhood plan and traffic needs." Had the de-
veloper used another design he would have been required to construct
lateral roads for diversion of local traffic to and from the boulevard at
a greater expense than the plan required by the city. Further, the
court found that, 'regardless of the design used, the subdivider would
have been required to dedicate the ten foot strip for widening of the
boulevard because of the additional traffic the subdivision would have
created. The ten foot strip of land required for the planting of trees
was required because of the cellular design of the subdivision which
necessitated a buffer zone to the boulevard. Although this strip may
not have been required had the subdivision been designed with direct
access to the boulevard, a more conventional design would have re-
quired additional land for diversionary streets in any event. Similarly,
the eighty foot strip of land required for the street which cut across the
subdivision would have been required to accommodate the increased
traffic generated by the subdivision development. The increased traf-
fic conditions caused by the subdivision would have also necessitated
dedication of the small triangular island so as to eliminate the traffic
hazard.
From the previous discussion it is readily apparent that the exac-
tions from the developer were directly related to the needs generated
by the subdivision, in all four instances. That is, the four require-
ments-the ten foot strip for widening the boulevard, the ten foot strip
for trees, the widening of the street which ran through the subdivision,
and the small triangular island-would have been approximately the
same regardless of the design of the subdivision so long as the same
number of units were built. This fact allowed the court to conclude:
[W]here it is a condition reasonably related to increased traffic
and other needs of the proposed subdivision [dedication] is volun-
tary in theory and not contrary to constitutional concepts. 53
Thus, actual -use of the street by the community was not the basis
of the holding, even though the Ayers court referred to the "benefit
[to] the city as a whole." Rather, the benefit to the public was the
general free flow of traffic and conformity with the neighborhood plan
and design made possible by the cellular design of the subdivision.
munity is also benefited by the expenditure .... The courts, in other words, were
saying that so long as there is some reasonable relation between the needs normally
generated by a use and the conditions imposed on the use no taking has occurred."
Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1132-33.
53. 34 Cal. 2d at 42, 207 P.2d at 8 (dictum).
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Since Ayers there have been a number of approaches taken by
courts in other jurisdictions for testing the reasonableness of the method
used to achieve the objectives of subdivision exaction statutes. Many
of the cases have cited Ayers in support of their position. Since the
various judicial approaches provide the background on which Associ-
ated was decided, the next sections discuss these approaches in some
detail.
Correlative Need Theory
One formulation used by some courts to test the regulatory na-
ture of subdivision exactions has been to require a one-to-one rela-
tionship between the exaction and the need generated by development
of the subdivision. The logic of this formula is as follows: the influx
of people creates a need for municipal facilities to serve them; cost ac-
counting techniques are available to determine, with relative certainty,
the amount necessary to satisfy the needs of the new residents;5  thus,
municipalities may only require an amount of land or fees to satisfy
the needs generated by the subdivision itself.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Rosen v. Village of Downers
Grove55 was the first court to use the Ayers opinion to support a for-
mula relating the exaction to the needs generated by the subdivision.
In Rosen the subdivider sued to enjoin school officials from enforcing
an ordinance requiring dedication of land to the public for "educa-
tional purposes." The state enabling statute referred to dedication re-
quirements for school grounds; however, the local planning commis-
sion attempted to exact fees in lieu of land which were to be used for
general educational purposes. The court found that: (1) the fee tech-
nique used by the commission was beyond statutory authorization; and
(2) the term "educational purposes" was broader than the term "school
grounds" used in the state enabling statute. In reaching its decision,
the court construed Ayers in the following manner:
The distinction between permissible and forbidden requirements is
suggested in Ayers . . . which indicates that the municipality
may require the developer to provide the streets which are required
by the activity within the subdivision but cannot require him to
provide a major thoroughfare, the need for which stems from the
total activity of the community. 56
As has already been discussed, Ayers did in fact allow a dedication re-
quirement for a major thoroughfare outside of the subdivision. While
it is true that the exaction in Ayers was not made on the ground that
the total activity of the community had increased, the dedication was
54. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1141-46.
55. 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
56. Id. at 453, 167 N.E.2d at 234.
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certainly not based on the location of the streets as intimated by the
Rosen court. Whether the specific needs were represented within or
without the subdivision was immaterial in Ayers. Instead, the con-
trolling determination in Ayers was that the exaction was based on
the increased traffic generated by the creation of the subdivision.
The dicta in Rosen concerning Ayers was cited in a subsequent
Illinois case, Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Pros-
pect,57 to establish the prevailing rule in Illinois concerning subdivi-
sion exactions. Pioneer involved a mandamus proceeding to compel
the city to approve the subdivider's map without the necessity of com-
plying with a local ordinance requiring dedication of land for a school.
The court held the ordinance invalid because there was no showing
that the exaction was related to the activities of the subdivider. In the
court's view, the central question was who should be required to pay for
the improvements. The court concluded that the subdivider should
not be forced to remedy a problem which resulted from the total de-
velopment of the community, and stated the following rule:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the
municipality and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the requirement
is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation
of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibi,
tions rather than reasonable regulation under the police power.
58
This rule-that the needs generated by the subdivision determine
the permissible scope of the exaction-is somewhat broader than the
dicta in Rosen, but is actually a more valid interpretation of the Ayers
decision.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a modified version of Pio-
neer in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls.59 In Jordan a city or-
dinance exacted a fee of $200 per lot in lieu of dedication of land for
park and school purposes. The developer paid the fee under protest
and sued for a refund. The court found that the exaction was valid
under the city ordinance, and, after quoting the above passage from
Pioneer, said:
We deem this to be an acceptable statement of the yardstick to
be applied, provided the words "specifically and uniquely attrib-
57. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
58. Id. at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 802 (emphasis added). "It is most likely, then,
that the Illinois court [in Pioneer] was disturbed by the absence of a formula relating
need and exaction in order to avoid discrimination and taking. Modem cost-account-
ing techniques can provide adequate formulas to relate need and exaction and thus
satisfy the conventional cost-generation approach of the Illinois court." Heyman &
Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1136.
59. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4
(1966).
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utable to his activity" are not so restrictively applied as to cast an
unreasonable burden of proof upon the municipality which has
enacted the ordinance under attack. 60
The court thus modified the Pioneer test by the introduction of equit-
able discretion in applying the "specifically and uniquely attributable"
test.
The Pioneer rule was adopted in substance in Montana in Billings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County."' An action for a declaratory
judgment was brought by a subdivider to determine the validity of state
statutes requiring dedication of a fixed percentage of subdivision land
for parks and playgrounds. The subdivider's map was rejected when
he failed to dedicate land in compliance with the statutes. The court
upheld the validity of the statutes and relied on Pioneer, Rosen and
Ayers to reach the following conclusion:
[T]his court is of the opinion that if the subdivision creates the
specific need for . . .parks . . . then it is not unreasonable to
charge the subdivider with the burden of providing them.62
Although the court used different words-specific need, rather than
specifically and uniquely attributable-the justification given for the
reasonableness of the exaction is the same basic formulation utilized
in Pioneer-the exaction is directly related to the need generated by
the subdivision.
In still another case, Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston.,63 a
developer in Rhode Island challenged, as beyond the scope of the police
power, a local ordinance requiring voluntary dedication of 7 percent of
his land for park purposes as a condition precedent to final map ap-
proval. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island labeled the fixed per-
centage exaction arbitrary and held the statute invalid. The court dis-
tinguished Pioneer from cases64 in other jurisdictions, which had al-
lowed exactions based on a fixed percentage of the development, and
concluded as follows:
60. Id. at 617, 137 N.W.2d at 447. "By requiring the village to establish a 'ra-
tional nexus' between its exactions and the public needs created by the new subdivision
as defined by the objectives in the enabling act, Jordan steers a moderate course be-
tween the judicial obstructionism of Pioneer Trust and the excessive deference of
Billings Properties." Johnston, supra note 1, at 917.
61. 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
62. Id. at 33, 394 P.2d at 187 (emphasis added).
63. 264 A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970).
64. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182
(1964) (discussed in text accompanying notes 61-62 supra); Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385
U.S. 4 (1966) (discussed in text accompanying notes 59-60 supra); Jenad, Inc. v.
Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 79-90 infra); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v.
Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. Supp. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (Super. Ct. 1967) (discussed in
text accompanying notes 74-75 infra).
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We are of the opinion, however, that the rule as enunciated in Pio-
neer is the more reasonable and should apply in this jurisdiction.
It seems obvious to us that a fixed percentage requirement will
inevitably create inequities, which will be less likely to arise un-
der the specifically and uniquely attributable formula.65
This same basic formulation was applied recently in Maryland in
the case of Baltimore Planning Commission v. Victor Development
Co.66 There, the developer wanted to build an apartment building,
and needed a building permit in order to obtain financing for the de-
velopment. The city rejected the developer's plan, and gave as its only
reason that the development would cause the public schools to become
overcrowded. The Maryland Court of Appeals accepted the devel-
oper's argument that there was no statutory authorization, in the city
charter or otherwise, which would allow the city planning commission
to refuse to grant approval of the developer's plan on that ground. In
dicta the court noted:
There is little doubt that the developer can be required to
deal with the problems he creates in his own subdivision but
there is even less doubt that he cannot be saddled with the resolu-
tion of problems common to the area and for which he is no
more responsible than other citizens.6'7
Three of the five cases discussed, Pioneer, Jordan and Frank, have
adopted the Pioneer criteria-that the exaction must be "specifically
and uniquely attributable" to the activity of the developer-in order to
test the regulatory nature of the exaction. The other two cases, Bill-
ings and Baltimore, use different language, "specific need" and "prob-
lems he creates," to reach the same basic result. To summarize, all
five cases hold that there must be a direct relationship between the ex-
action and the need generated by the subdivision.
Correlative Benefit Theory
The correlative need formulation considers only the acquisition
side of any exaction-the relationship between need and exaction.
Another approach to the problem is to consider the permissible uses
to which exactions of land or fees may be applied-the relationship be-
tween the exaction and the benefits conferred on the subdivision. Such
an approach may be described as a correlative benefit theory-there
must be a one-to-one relationship between the exaction made and the
benefit conferred on the subdivision.68  In other words, the exaction
can be used only for the direct benefit of the subdivision from which
65. 264 A.2d at 913.
66. 261 Md. 387, 275 A.2d 478 (1971).
67. Id. at 393, 275 A.2d at 482.
68. For a discussion of the correlative benefit theory see Heyman & Gilhool,
supra note 1, at 1128-30.
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the exaction was made. Under this theory, if the statute authorizing
the exactions did not restrict the exaction to that which would benefit
the subdivision, then the exaction would be unconstitutional because it
would be in the nature of a tax.
In one case where this approach was applied, Haugen v. Glea-
son,69 the developer was required to pay a fee of $37.50 per lot as a
condition for approval of his plan; the fees were to be used for acqui-
sition of land for parks. The developer challenged the constitutionality
of the statute authorizing such fees and sought declaratory relief and
a refund of his fee. The Supreme Court of Oregon held the statute in-
valid because there was no requirement that the fees thus collected be
expended to benefit the land being subdivided. Under the statute, the
fees became part of the public funds of the county and, therefore, were
in the nature of a tax which exceeded the constitutional bounds of the
police power. The court noted:
[The regulation] authorizes the county to lay a tax upon one class
of landowners for a public purpose which may be, but need not
be, related to the activity being regulated. The regulation cannot
stand because it fails to limit the use of money so produced to the
direct benefit of the regulated subdivision. 70
The same judicial approach was taken earlier in New York in
Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh.7 In that case the court
held a similar statute invalid because the expenditure of the fees exacted
was not directly related to the development of the subdivision. Gulest
was subsequently overruled by the New York Court of Appeals72 and is
discussed further below.7 3
The Need/Benefit Theory
A third judicial approach which has been taken by the courts is
merely a combination of the first two approaches-not only must there
be a one-to-one relationship between the exaction and the need gener-
ated by the subdivision, but there must also be a one-to-one relationship
between the exaction and the benefit conferred on the particular subdi-
vision. This is the most comprehensive standard adopted by the courts
as a judicial test for the validity of a subdivision exaction. Under this
approach, in order that an exaction retain its regulatory nature as an
exercise of the police power, the courts require that exactions of land
69. 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
70. Id. at 105, 359 P.2d at 111 (emphasis added).
71. 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd 15 App. Div. 2d
815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962). See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1136.
72. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 84, 218 N.E.2d 673, 675,
271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957-58 (1966).
73. See text accompanying notes 79-90 infra.
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or money based on the needs generated by the subdivision must be
used by the city only for the direct benefit of the subdivision involved.
A superior court in Connecticut used this rigorous approach in
Aunt Fack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission.74 In that case
the city ordinance required dedication of 4 percent of the developer's
land for parks or a fixed fee in lieu thereof. The fees were to be put
into a fund for parks or playgrounds for the use of residents of the
Town of Danbury. The court held that such a fee was a tax because
there was no restriction on the use of the fees and the statute was
therefore unconstitutional. As stated by the court:
[T]he developer may be required to assume those costs which are
specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity and which
would otherwise be borne by the public. Any moneys collected,
however, must be specifically confined and limited to the direct
benefit of the regulated subdivision. 75
The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the same judicial ap-
proach in Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Board.76 There, the
city attempted to require a developer to pave a 361 foot right of way
from the subdivision to an existing public road. The developer chal-
lenged the requirement on the ground that there was no statutory au-
thority requiring private developers to pave city streets. The court
agreed and invalidated the requirement on statutory grounds. The
court specifically refused to rule whether the city could require the de-
veloper to provide off-site improvements. In reaching its decision, the
court said:
It is clear to us that, assuming off-site improvements could be re-
quired of a subdivider, the subdivider could be compelled only to
bear that portion of the cost which bears a rational nexus to the
needs created by, and benefits conferred upon, the subdivision. It
would be impermissible to saddle the developer with the full cost
where other property owners receive a special benefit from the im-
provement.77
This judicial approach allows the most protection to the devel-
oper; yet it is not so restrictive as to thwart the policy of encouraging
municipalities to develop and implement long range plans. Nor should
it necessitate frequent and lengthy litigation resulting in delays in im-
plementation of these plans because, as stated earlier, cost accounting
techniques are available to determine and apportion the costs of new
facilities.78
74. 27 Conn. Supp. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (Super. Ct. 1967).
75. Id. at 77-78, 230 A.2d at 47.
76. 52 N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336 (1968).
77. Id. at 350, 245 A.2d at 337-38.
78. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1141-46,
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Incidental Need Theory
Another, much broader, judicial approach to permissible subdivi-
sion exactions has been taken in New York. This approach requires
only that an incidental relationship be established between the exaction
and the need generated by the subdivision. Other than this incidental
nexus, no judicial limitations are placed on the exactions which may
be required in the exercise of the police power to "regulate" subdivi-
sion development.
This liberal approach was taken in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scars-
dale79 where the city had enacted regulations which required subdi-
viders to pay a fee of $250 per lot, in lieu of dedication of land, to be
collected and "credited to a separate fund to be used for park, play-
ground and recreational purposes in such manner as may be deter-
mined by the Village Board of Trustees from time to time."80  In vali-
dating the statute, the New York Court of Appeals overruled the prior
Gulest decision which had held fee requirements invalid because there
was no requirement in the statute for a relationship between the exac-
tion and the benefit conferred upon the subdivision. The court noted,
however, that even if Gulest was correct, it would have had no bearing
on the Jenad decision because the fees collected in Jenad were put into
a fund for park and recreational purposes and could be expended only
for "acquisition and improvement of recreation and park lands in the
village."'" In response to the developer's contention that the fee was
a tax, the court glibly retorted: "This is not a tax at all but a reasonable
form of village planning for the general community good."' s2  The
court glossed over any possible objections to the dedication require-
ments for parks saying that the requirements were merely a kind of
zoning "akin . . . to other reasonable requirements for necessary sew-
ers, water mains, lights, sidewalks, etc."'83 In its cursory opinion, the
court cited a portion of Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,84 as fol-
lows:
It was held in the Jordan case that it was not necessary to prove
that the land required to be dedicated for a park or school site
was to meet a need solely attributable to the influx into the com-
munity of people who would occupy this particular subdivision.
The court concluded that "a required dedication . . . should be
upheld . . . if the evidence reasonably establishes that the mu-
nicipality will be required to provide more land for schools, parks,
and playgrounds as a result of approval of the subdivision."8
79. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
80. Id. at 82, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
81. Id. at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
82. Id. at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4
(1966).
85. 18 N.Y.2d at 85, 218 N.E.2d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958-59.
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Jenad's interpretation of the Jordan case appears to be erroneous inas-
much as it ignores the fact that Jordan specifically adopted the test that
an exaction is valid only if it is "specifically and uniquely attributable"
to the activity of the developer. The New York court's further rational-
ization that the Scarsdale exaction is "a reasonable form of village plan-
ning for the general community good" 6 and that it was "merely a kind
of zoning,"87 as if there were some magic in these words, would not ap-
pear to overcome the constitutional considerations which must be dis-
cussed in determining the validity of the exactions in question. There
is nothing in the opinion of the New York court relating the fee of $200
per lot to the needs generated by the subdivision, nor any limitation
imposed requiring that the fee be used for the benefit of the particular
subdivision. 8 Regarding this latter point, the court specifically over-
ruled Gulests9 which had held that the fees must be used for the direct
benefit of the subdivision. More significantly, the court did not for-
mulate any constitutional limits regarding permissible exactions.90 To
summarize, the judicial approach of the New York court in Jenad is
far less rigorous than the other approaches described earlier. In fact,
it may be considered the most liberal of the four attempts made by the
courts to determine a constitutional standard for testing the validity of
subdivision exactions. Under this approach, once a need is established
by the creation of a subdivision, the municipality may exact a fixed
fee without regard to any direct relationship between that fee and the
need generated. Furthermore, it may spend that fee on general com-
munity needs without limiting the expenditure to the direct benefit of
the subdivision paying the fee.
Summary
There is no pretense made that the formulas discussed above are
endowed with any magical or mathematical certainty, nor that they
represent the only possible approaches which could be taken. They
86. Id. at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
87. Id.
88. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 920-21.
89. 18 N.Y.2d at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 957. See Johnston,
supra note 1, at 920.
90. The decision was 4-3. A vigorous dissent by Judge Van Voorhis began as
follows: "The principle of decision in this case would constitutionally allow municipal
officers to prohibit real estate development in cities, towns and villages unless the
newcomers pay whatever sums of money the local public authorities may decide arbi-
trarily to impose upon them for the privilege of moving into the community, to be
spent on schools, public buildings, police and fire protection, parks and recreation or
any other general municipal purpose past, present or to come, and without relation to
special benefits or assessed valuation." 18 N.Y.2d at 86, 218 N.E.2d at 677, 271
N.Y.S.2d at 959.
February 19721 SUBDIVISION EXACIONS
are used here only to illustrate the various approaches taken by courts
which have considered the problem. Conceivably the jurisdictions util-
izing either of the first two formulations-the correlative need theory or
the correlative benefit theory-could have adopted the third formula-
tion, which was merely a combination of the two, had the issues been
before the respective courts for decision.
Many of the issues presented in the cases discussed in this section
were also presented in Associated. It is with the background of these
four formulations-the correlative need theory; the correlative benefit
theory; the need/benefit theory; and the incidental need theory-that
Associated was decided.
Arguments Presented in Associated
Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, a nonprofit
corporation, brought suit in a class action asking for declaratory and
injunctive relief and challenging the constitutionality of section 11546
and the Walnut Creek implementing ordinance and resolutions. The
corporation also contended that the Walnut Creek legislation did not
comply with the provisions of section 11546. The trial court found
for the city"' and the California Supreme Court affirmed the decision
holding that: (1) section 11546 and the city's implementing legisla-
tion were constitutional; and (2) the city's legislation complied with the
provisions of section 11546.
The court in Associated was presented with a variety of conten-
91. Throughout its opening brief, plaintiff-appellant argued that subdividing was
a constitutionally protected right. Opening Brief for Appellant at 30-31, Associated
Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr.
630, appeal dismissed, 92 S. Ct. 202 (1971).
On appeal the intermediate court noted: "At the outset, we must emphasize that
the sale and subdivision of land for the purpose [of sale] is not a privilege, but a right.
Likewise, under the existing plethora of laws, in which the subdivider has no practical
freedom of action, it cannot longer be said that in presenting a subdivision map for
approval, there is an implied consent to mandatory dedication." 90 Cal. Rptr. 663,
670. In a footnote the court stated: "Any rationalization that by presenting a sub-
division map for approval, the subdivider voluntarily offers to make any 'dedications'
required by the authorities is a fiction which cannot be permitted to subvert the con-
stitution." Id. at 670 n.8.
These two points, among others, virtually compelled the supreme court to hear the
case in light of the earlier Ayers opinion. In fact, the city made the issue whether
subdividing was a right or a privilege one of its three major contentions on appeal.
Respondents' Petition for a Hearing by the Supreme Court at 9-11, Associated Home
Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr.
630, appeal dismissed, 92 S. Ct. 202 (1971). The supreme court, however, dis-
missed this issue at the beginning of its opinion. See text accompanying note 105
infra.
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tions by the plaintiff concerning the constitutionality of section 1154692
92. Only two of the seven arguments presented by the plaintiff challenging the
constitutionality of section 11546 are discussed in this section of the text. While the
five other points of contention are important in themselves, they are not as significant
to the decision in Associated as are the two discussed in the text. The other five argu-
ments are as follows:
(1) The conditions imposed by section 11546 could only be made if they were
related to the health and safety of the subdivision residents as were the conditions for
streets, sewers and drainage facilities. The court found that parks were also related to
the health and welfare of subdivision residents and that it knew of no case holding to
the contrary. 4 Cal. 3d at 641, 484 P.2d at 612, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636. The dissent
in Ayers unwittingly forecast this result and possibly the result of future litigation:
"If a legislative body finds that public necessity requires the taking of property for
highways, for streets, for a water supply, for recreational areas, for hospitals, for
schools or other public buildings, or for a myriad of other public purposes, the courts
must accept such a finding as conclusive. If such a finding is all that is necessary to
warrant the exercise of the police power, there will be no occasion for the state or
other public agency ever paying for any private property taken or damaged for a
public improvement" 34 Cal. 2d at 48, 207 P.2d at 11.
(2) If section 11546 were upheld as a valid exercise of the police power, then
cities could also require contributions for such services as added costs of fire and
police protection, the construction of a new city hall and a general contribution to de-
fray additional costs of all types of governmental services necessitated by the sub-
division. The court distinguished the capital costs generated by the subdivision from
the more general and diffuse costs for services. Also, the court emphasized the
unique problem with land; it is a limited resource. The subdivision diminished the
supply of land but increased the demand for it by bringing in new residents. The de-
cision was restricted to the validity of the exactions required by section 11546 and
special mention was made of the fact that there was no implication that the requirements
under section 11546 were the only ones that could be made. The requirements of section
11546 were justified only because the increase in residents created the need for park
facilities and the land or fees were to be used for the new residents, and that these
considerations distinguished them from such matters as the increased cost of gov-
ernmental services. 4 Cal. 3d at 641-42 & n.8, 484 P.2d at 613 & n.8, 94 Cal. Rptr.
at 637 & n.8. For a discussion of the distinction between capital costs and service
costs see Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1120-21.
(3) Section 11546 was a double tax. The court summarily dismissed this claim
noting that section 11546 provided for the initial cost of the facilities, while subsequent
property taxes provided for the development and maintenance of the facilities. 4 Cal.
3d at 642, 484 P.2d at 613-14, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637-38. A related argument was that
the exactions were special assessments without the right to a hearing or protest. The
court only noted that similar arguments were rejected in Jordan and Jenad. Id. at
642 n.10, 484 P.2d at 614 n.10, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638 n.10. For discussions comparing
subdivision exactions and assessments see Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1136-55;
Reps & Smith, supra note 1, at 407-12.
(4) Section 11546 arbitrarily affected only subdividers. See discussion of this
point in text accompanying note 133 infra.
(5) The delegation of authority contained in section 11546(f) was arbitrary.
Subsection (f) provides that the city must specify when development of the park or
recreational facilities will begin. The corporation contended that the discretion avail-
able to the city was arbitrary and was violative of due process and equal protection of
the laws. The court noted that: (1) the need for parks would vary from community
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and the Walnut Creek legislation. The plaintiff assailed section
to community; and (2) the city's resolution 2225 provides that development and im-
provements would be made as they became necessary. The court considered this
statement sufficient to satisfy constitutional standards and reminded the corporation
that the courts were available to redress any unreasonable delay. 4 Cal. 3d at 643,
484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638. The court footnoted an additional argument
that subdivision (g) of section 11546 was discriminatory because it provided for pay-
ment of fees only from subdivisions containing fifty parcels or less. The court an-
swered that the same population density formula applied to subdivisions with more or
less than fifty parcels so a definition of the word "parcel" was not essential. Id. at 643
n.11, 484 P.2d at 614 n.11, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638 n.11.
The court summarized its discussion of the constitutionality of section 11546 as
follows: "The clear weight of authority upholds the constitutionality of statutes similar
to section 11546. [The court here reviewed the holdings of Pioneer, Billings, Jenad,
Jordan and Aunt Hack] ...
"The rationale of the cases affirming constitutionality indicate the dedication stat-
utes are valid under the state's police power. They reason that the subdivider realizes a
profit from governmental approval of a subdivision since his land is rendered more
valuable by the fact of subdivision, and in return for this benefit the city may require
him to dedicate a portion of his land for park purposes whenever the influx of new res-
idents will increase the need for park and recreational facilities [citing Jordan and
Billings]. Such exactions have been compared to admittedly valid zoning regulations
such as minimum lot size and setback requirements [citing Jenad]." Id. at 644-45, 484
P.2d at 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
93. The plaintiff presented four arguments against the constitutionality of the sec-
tion 10-1.516 of the Walnut Creek Municipal Code. They are as follows:
(1) Under the ordinance, the fees were determined arbitrarily and without a rea-
sonable relationship to principles of equality. For a discussion of this contention, see
text accompanying note 137 infra.
(2) Procedures and standards set forth in the ordinance were indefinite and ar-
bitrary. The plaintiff urged that the concept of fair ma ket value was too indefinite a
standard and that the city should not have absolute discretion to determine when fees
should be paid. The court brushed aside the first contention noting that the question
of fair market value was frequently litigated and no authority cited required a more
precise definition. The court found that the city's resolution 2225 established suffi-
ciently precise criteria for requiring in lieu fees. Fees would be required when the slope,
topography and geology of the site and its surroundings made dedication impossible,
impractical or undesirable. 4 Cal. 3d at 645-46 & n.15, 484 P.2d at 616 & n.15, 94
Cal. Rptr. at 640 & n.15.
(3) A provision in the ordinance allowing credit at the option of the city and,
thus, reducing the requirements imposed on the developer would result in unequal
treatment. Credit would be given if the developer guaranteed that certain portions of
the subdivision would be permanently maintained for use as park or recreational facili-
ties. The specific complaint was that there were no standards for determining when
credit should be given. The court found this practice acceptable because it supported a
legislative policy of encouraging municipalities to adopt long range master plans. To
hold to the contrary would thwart this policy and would undermine the flexibility of
the municipality in controlling community growth. This was the type of haphazard
pattern of community growth that subsection (d) of section 11546 was designed to
eliminate. Subsection (d) requires the adoption of an overall plan with a recreational
element before exactions for park purposes can be made. Id. at 646, 484 P.2d at
616-17, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41.
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11546 as being unconstitutional because it failed to satisfy what has
been referred to in this note as the correlative need theory developed
in Pioneer or the correlative benefit theory developed in HaugenY4 In
presenting both of these theories for consideration, the plaintiff was in
effect also presenting the need/benefit theory for the court's consider-
ation, since it is a combination of the first two theories.
The primary contention95 of the plaintiff was that section 11546
was not within the scope of the police power and was nothing more
than a veiled form of eminent domain. The plaintiff acknowledged
that subdivision regulation was legitimately within the police power,
but argued that subdividers were entitled to the constitutional protec-
tions afforded land owners from the improper exercise of the police
power. The plaintiff concluded that the statute improperly allowed
the taking of property for public use without just compensation." In
essence this argument was the same argument that was presented, and
sustained, in Pioneer where the court found that the only constitution-
ally permissible exactions were those that were specifically and uniquely
attributable to the developer's activities. In fact, the plaintiff's argu-
ment placed great emphasis on the Pioneer decision, especially its con-
struction of the California court's holding in the earlier Ayers case."7
(4) Any fees exacted could be used only to purchase land. The court held that
the fees could be used to acquire or improve the land but not for purposes unrelated to
those ends. It based its findings on the phrases "park or recreational purposes" and
"park and recreational facilities" in section 11546 noting that the word "purposes" was
broader than the word "facilities." Id. at 646-47, 484 P.2d at 617, 94 Cal. Rptr. at
641. The plaintiff also contended that the Walnut Creek legislation did not comply
with the provisions of section 11546. In very brief language the court rejected this
contention and noted that a long range park plan existed and contained sufficiently
definite principles and standards to satisfy the statute. The plan indicated the loca-
tion of various types of parks and contained principles for their development. Also,
resolution 2225, which contained the standards for determining the amount of the
exaction, was incorporated into section 10-1.516 of the Walnut Creek Code because
it was passed with the same formality as a statute. This satisfied the requirements of
subdivision (b) of section 11546 which requires the ordinance to state the standards
for determining the amount of the exaction. Id. at 647-48, 484 P.2d 617-18, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 641-42.
94. The court questioned the plaintiff's standing in this action because the plain-
tiff admitted that it would pass the costs on to the future residents of the subdivision
and not suffer any detriment. But the court preferred to decide the matter on the
merits. Id. at 642 n.9, 484 P.2d at 613 n.9, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637 n.9.
95. The plaintiff did not set out his arguments in the manner that they are
listed in the court's opinion. They are presented here according to the weight given
to them in the opinion. Also, the plaintiff did not use the language of the four the-
ories presented in this note. The arguments were presented in constitutional terms and
"labels" are attached to those arguments here for the purpose of analysis.
96. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 91, at 16-24, 29-40, 60-61.
97. Id. at 17-20. It is interesting to note that respondent city thought that section
11546 met the test outlined in Pioneer. "Respondent City strongly contends that
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The plaintiff reasoned that park and recreational needs stem from
the total development and activity of the entire community and not just
from the activities of a particular subdivision.1 Therefore, all tax-
payers should share the cost of these facilities. Thus, the plaintiff con-
tended that statutes like section 11546 can be justified only if permissi-
ble exactions are restricted to the specific need generated by the sub-
division alone.
The plaintiff also contended that section 11546 was invalid be-
cause there was no provision in the statute relating the exactions to
the benefit of the subdivision concerned. 9 This argument, of course, is
described in this note as the correlative benefit theory. The plaintiff
reasoned that the statute merely authorized an assessment of fees and
that lack of any provision for a direct benefit to the subdivision from
such assessment took the statute out of the realm of regulation and
placed it in the realm of taxation.1"' As a taxation statute, it denied
future residents of the subdivision the equal protection of the laws.
The plaintiff relied on the legislative history of the statute to show
that a direct benefit property tax had been considered by the legislature
and rejected.' The plaintiff contended that the provisions of subdivi-
sion (e) of section 11546, which required only a reasonable relation-
ship between the exaction and the use of the park by the future resi-
dents, were not precise enough to justify the statute as a police power
regulation. The plaintiff alleged that the lack of more precise stand-
ards under the statute could subject a developer to the payment of more
than his fair share of the cost of park facilities. Further, possible in-
equities in the statute were magnified by the fact that the SMA was
discriminatory in operation because it did not impose any exaction re-
quirements on nonsubdividers, such as apartment house builders. To
illustrate his point, the plaintiff posed the example of apartment houses
situated adjacent to a subdivision, where residents of both develop-
ments used the park facilities, but only the subdivision residents were
required to pay for them.'0 2
The court did not squarely confront the plaintiff's arguments, and
instead, upheld the statute under the theory similar to the incidental
§ 11546 meets the test laid down in the Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank case . . . and
upheld in the Billings, Jordan, Jenad and Aunt Hack Ridge Estates cases ... in that
the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable to his
activity." Reply Brief for Respondent at 41, Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City
of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed,
92S. Ct. 202 (1971).
98. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 91, at 38-40.
99. Id. at 41-43.
100. id.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id. at 42-43.
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need theory outlined above in the New York case of Jenad.10 3 Adop-
ion of this theory allowed the court to summarily reject the plaintiff's
arguments and to circumvent the constitutional issues raised by the
plaintiff. The court then presented its own justification for the stat-
ute using selected portions of prior case law, legislative history and pub-
lic policy considerations to support its decision.
Criticism of Associated
The court cited Ayers as prior California case authority establish-
ing the requisite constitutional standard necessary to adjudicate a sub-
division exaction dispute. The court, however, constructed Ayers in a
manner which was antithetical to the construction given to that case in
Pioneer. The construction given to Ayers by the court in Associated
was what this note has previously described as the incidental need the-
ory. The court in Pioneer, of course, construed Ayers to embody the
correlative need theory. In the process of adopting the incidental need
theory, the Associated court rejected the first two formulations-the
correlative need and correlative benefit theories-and, thereby, neces-
sarily rejected a combination of those two, the need/benefit theory. In
reaching its decision, the court reinterpreted and broadened its prior
holding in Ayers, noted the urgency of the current requirement for
parks as explained in the legislative history of section 11546, and an-
nounced its support of the public policy to preserve open space lands.
The court concluded that there has been no unconstitutional discrimina-
tion in the application of section 11546 or the Walnut Creek legislation.
As will be discussed, Associated has established a much broader con-
stitutional standard for upholding subdivision exactions than would
have been necessary to uphold the particular statutes involved in the
case. As a result, the court has indicated a willingness to allow much
more under the guise of regulation than do decisions in other jurisdic-
tions.
Ayers: Distinguishable Authority
The court relied heavily on Ayers as authority to reject the plain-
tiff's initial contention that section 11546 could only be justified if it
were shown that the need for the facilities was attributable to the in-
crease in population stimulated by the new subdivision alone. 104 The
court did not directly confront this issue, but noted that arguments
similar to those presented by the plaintiff in Associated were rejected
in Ayers. The court stated that Ayers had held that: (1) the sub-
divider had the duty to comply with reasonable conditions for the wel-
103. See text accompanying notes 79-90 supra.
104. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
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fare of the lot owners and the general public; (2) the conditions im-
posed on the developer were not improper because they would inci-
dentally benefit the city as a whole; and (3) present and future need
and population factors could be taken into consideration in determin-
ing the amount of permissible exactions. °5
As has been previously discussed,106 the decision in Ayers was
based on a factual situation in which the exactions had been directly
related to the needs created by the subdivision and had resulted in a
benefit to future lot owners. In fact, the Ayers decision cited in detail
the trial court's findings to this effect."' By citing the Ayers holdings
without reference to its factual situation, the court gave Ayers an en-
tirely different interpretation than has been given the case by other
courts. In its interpretation of Ayers, the court apparently adopted
the incidental need theory of permissible subdivision exactions which
has been previously discussed. This, of course, is entirely different
than the interpretation of Ayers by the Pioneer court, which adopted
the correlative need theory. Thus cited out of context, the holdings of
the Ayers case would indicate that, by development of a subdivision, a
subdivider can be required to entirely remedy general public needs
which he has only partially created. However, the Ayers case must be
put into its factual context to determine what was meant in reference to
the "general welfare . . . of the public" and only "incidentally [a]
benefit [to] the city as a whole."'0 8  The public welfare and benefit to
the city referred to in Ayers were not the actual physical use of the ded-
icated land, since there would always be incidental use of streets by
anyone entering or leaving the subdivision. Ayers instead referred to an
indirect benefit for the general welfare-conformity to the overall plan to
reduce traffic congestion that would result from the increased traffic
caused by the development of the subdivision. The court in Ayers had
concluded that the dedication requirements were as much a part of the
design of the subdivision as would lateral and transverse service roads
have been had the subdivider used a noncellular design.' 09
Nevertheless, in its new interpretation of Ayers the court in As-
sociated rejected the plaintiff's contention that the statute could only be
justified under the Pioneer formulation.1"' That is, in Associated, the
105. Id.
106. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
107. Ayers v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 38-39, 207 P.2d 1, 5-6 (1949).
108. Id. at 41-42, 207 P.2d at 7.
109. Id. at 40-41, 207 P.2d at 6-7.
110. "The only case cited by Associated which declared a statute similar to section
11546 to be unconstitutional recognized the need for recreational facilities caused by
the influx of new residents but held that the need for such facilities must be 'spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable' to the subdivider's activities and that the record
did not indicate that this requirement had been met [citing Pioneer]. We have
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court relied on Ayers to reject the correlative benefit theory, even
though the facts of Ayers clearly showed that the exaction had been
justified on the basis of a need generated by creation of the subdivision
alone, which had also been the basis of the holding in Pioneer."' It
should also be noted that the supreme courts of Illinois, Montana,
Rhode Island and Wisconsin all relied on Ayers in support of the for-
mulation proposed by the plaintiff, and which was rejected by the Cali-
fornia court in Associated."2  If those courts were faced with a statute
similar to section 11546, they would hold that the statute could be jus-
tified only if the need for the facility was directly attributable to the
activity of the subdivider; this interpretation of Ayers would more
closely approximate the holding of the court in Ayers." 3
Public Needs and Subdivision Exactions
Although the court held that Ayers was sufficient authority to
support its decision, section 11546 was also justified by the court on a
completely separate ground-"a general public need for recreational
rejected this rationale in our previous discussion." 4 Cal. 3d at 641 n.7, 484 P.2d at
613 n.7, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637 n.7.
111. "Pioneer Trust relied upon Ayers, interpreting it as holding that a developer
may be compelled to provide the streets which are required by the activity within the
subdivision but cannot be required to provide a major thoroughfare, the need for
which stems from the total activity of the community. The court in Pioneer Trust
goes on to state that in light of this principle a dedication requirement may be upheld
only if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable to
his activity and that no such showing was made. The Ayers case cannot be inter-
preted in this manner. One commentator has written that Pioneer Trust completely
misunderstood the holding of Ayers." Id. at 644 n.13, 484 P.2d at 615 n.13, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 639 n.13. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 893-94, 907-08. Ayers, of course,
allowed dedication of land outside of the subdivision, but the dedication requirement
was not based on the location of the streets. It was based on the increased traffic
needs generated by the subdivision and those traffic needs were specifically and uniquely
attributable to the activity of the subdivider. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
Two other writers, however, have given Ayers the same interpretation as was given to
it by the California court. See note 52 supra.
112. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 40-41. Cf. Bowden, supra note 1, at 482.
113. As this note has attempted to illustrate, the courts have taken a wide variety
of approaches to the constitutionality of subdivision exactions. Commentators have
given various interpretations to what the courts have said. See note 111 supra.
However, the consensus of the writers who have taken a position on the subject advo-
cates one of the more rigorous approaches to the constitutionality of subdivision exac-
tions. See generally Cutler, supra note 1, at 390; Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1,
at 1134, 1141-54; Hirsch & Shapiro, Some Economic Implications of City Planning, 14
U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 1312, 1325-26 (1967); Reps & Smith, supra note 1, at 407; Schmandt,
Municipal Control of Urban Expansion, 29 FORDHAm L. Rv. 637, 650 (1961); Note,
Land Subdivision Regulation: Its Effects and Constitutionality, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv.
374, 376-77 (1967); Comment, Subdivision Regulation: Requiring Dedication of Park
Land or Payment of Fees as a Condition Precedent to Plat Approval, 1961 Wis. L. REv.
310, 320-22.
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facilities caused by present and future subdivisions." ' 1 4 The court found
support for its public needs concept from three sources. First, the
court noted that governmental entities have the responsibility to provide
parks and recreation land for the public, and that section XXVIII of
the California Constitution has established as a public policy the main-
tenance and preservation of open space lands for the economic and
social well-being of the state and its citizens. Second, the court cited
general introductory comments in the legislative committee report rec-
ommending section 11546 in which the need for open space and the
necessity of parks for a full community life had been emphasized.
Third, the court noted that the projected increase in population was
expected to increase by tenfold the demand for outdoor recreation in
the future. The court summarized its policy argument as follows:' 15
We see no persuasive reason in the face of these urgent needs...
on the one hand and the disappearance of open land on the other
to hold that . . . the dedication of land by a subdivider may bejustified only upon the ground that the particular subdivider...
solely by the development of his subdivision, increase[s] the need
for recreational facilities to such an extent that additional land for
such facilities will be required." 6
The most troublesome aspect of the court's formulation of public
needs as the justification for section 11546 was the merger of two dis-
tinct constitutional concepts-even though parks may be a legitimate
purpose for which exactions may be made, there is also the issue of
permissible methods of making those exactions. As previously dis-
cussed,11 7 the purpose of the exactions and the regulatory method used
to obtain the exactions are two entirely separate constitutional questions.
While it is true that a legislatively declared public need is justification
for the purpose of a statute, it does not necessarily follow that the
method used will also withstand constitutional scrutiny. The court by
basing its justification of section 11546 as a whole on the ground of a
general public need for parks blurs this distinction. Certainly, by now,
114. 4 Cal. 3d at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
115. Not content with deciding this issue, the court noted that it perceived merit
in the argument of amicus curiae Sierra Club which urged that the fees could be used
to purchase or develop land some distance from the subdivision even if the fees were
used for facilities used by the general public and would not directly benefit future
residents of the subdivision. The court could not see why this was not a viable solu-
tion in light of the need for such facilities. Id. at 640 n.6, 484 P.2d at 612 n.6, 94
Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.6. This statement by the court is superfluous to the decision but
is an indication of how far the court is willing to go in justifying statutes similar to
section 11546. Yet nowhere does the court mention why it is not a tax or why it is
not an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
116. Id. at 639-40, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
117. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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there is no question that parks are needed by the public and can be
obtained through a proper exercise of the police power. The method
used, however, must be one reasonably designed to accomplish the de-
sired objective, and unless so limited, would represent an unauthor-
ized taking of property for a public use without just compensation in
violation of eminent domain provisions of the state and federal consti-
tutions. The court in Associated appears to have extended its justifica-
tion for the purpose of section 11546 to the method it prescribes. In
other words, the justification for the method employed in obtaining the
exactions is the same as the justification for its purpose-a general pub-
liec need for park facilities. This rationale, of course, severely limits
any constitutional restraints on the exercise of the police power to "reg-
ulate" subdivisions. The decision in Associated thus represents a ju-
dicial attitude that constitutional considerations inherent in subdivision
exactions may be summarily swept aside if the exigencies of the times
so dictate.118
Of particular significance is the fact that the court has now laid
the groundwork for broader interpretations of the scope of permissi-
ble exactions in any subsequent decisions. The fact that the court
stated there were sufficient grounds based on its interpretation of Ayers,
quite apart from any "public needs" argument, to reject the plaintiff's
contention that exactions could be justified only if they were attribut-
able solely to the development of the subdivision would lend credence
to the view that the court may have been looking beyond the facts in
Associated in its decision. One of the problems of the earlier Ayers
decision was its susceptibility to various interpretations as evidenced in
Pioneer and Associated. The court's insertion of a general public
need as justification for the statute, would also appear to be suscepti-
ble to varying interpretations because it is not clear from the opinion
what has been justified, the purpose of the statute or the method used
under the statute.
Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation
The plaintiff's second contention concerned the relationship be-
tween the exaction and the benefit conferred on the subdivision. The
plaintiff argued that even if it was conceded that no direct relationship
between the subdivision and the communities needs were required, the
exaction could only be used to primarily benefit his particular subdivi-
118. The dissenting justices in Ayers, neither on the bench when Associated was
presented for decision, feared exactly this point: "Manifestly, the correct test of
whether or not the police power has been properly exercised is not and never has
been the degree of public necessity . . . . [If the degree of public necessity be the
test, then the constitutional guarantee of just compensation for property taken for a
public use is completely and forever abrogated." 34 Cal. 2d at 48, 207 P.2d at 11.
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sion. This argument, of course, was similar to the correlative benefit
argument advanced in Haugen.119
The court summarily dismissed the plaintiff's contention that the
statute was invalid on this ground and, without discussing any consti-
tutional issues, referred to subdivisions (c) and (e) of section 11546 to
answer the challenge. These sections provide that the exaction can be
used only for the purpose of providing park facilities to serve the sub-
division, and also provide that the amount of the exaction should bear
a reasonable relationship to the use of the facilities by future residents
of the subdivision.
As a matter of judicial interpretation, when words in statutes are
ambiguous, courts normally consult legislative history and other ex-
trinsic material to determine the legislative intent underlying a statute
to resolve the ambiguity. The words "serve" and "reasonable relation-
ship" are necessarily imprecise and would have normally required in-
terpretation by the court. In Associated the court apparently concluded
that the legislative intent was inherent in the wording used by the leg-
islature, and there was no need for any discussion of constitutional
questions in construing the statute. It would thus logically follow that
the court should have attempted to determine, from the history of the
statute and other extrinsic material, what the legislature had in fact in-
tended when it used these particular words, or when it drafted the en-
tire statute for that matter. If the court had made this examination, it
would have found evidence in the legislative history of section 11546
and other related material which indicated that the legislature had in-
tended to adopt either the correlative benefit theory, or the need/bene-
fit theory discussed above, and not the incidental need theory which was
ultimately adopted by the court. 120
There is language in the committee report on which section 11546
was based that indicates that the legislature intended to limit the exac-
tion to the benefit conferred on the subdivision. For example, city and
county officials testifying before the legislative committee considering
section 11546 had concluded that it was legitimate to assess the sub-
division developer for the privilege of subdividing and that the "direct
benefit theory" should be used in making the exaction.' 21  The com-
mittee also relied on Kelber v. City of Upland122 as authority for the
proposition that fees for parks would be held invalid if the fees were
to be used to subsidize parks for the benefit of the community as a
whole and not for the benefit of the affected subdivisions. There was
119. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
120. 6 Final Report of the Assembly Interim Comm. on Municipal and County
Government 33-45, in 1 APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY,
Reg. Sess., First & Second Extraordinary Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Report].
121. 1965 Report, supra note 120, at 34.
122. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
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also testimony by developers that few communities had felt restrained
by Kelber and had continued to "extract and extort"'23 land or monies
from subdividers who were too committed to their developments to pro-
test the exactions in litigation.' The committee thus concluded that
a statute authorizing dedication for parks should be added to the Sub-
division Map Act that "will guarantee that the fees assessed or land
taken will benefit the residents of the affected subdivision.' 25  This
language in the committee report is an embodiment of the correlative
benefit theory described earlier-that there be a direct relationship be-
tween the exaction and the benefit.
There is other language in the committee report that indicates
that the legislature intended to limit the exaction to both the need gen-
erated by the subdivision and the benefit conferred on it. For example,
the committee had originally recommended a statute for park exactions
almost identical to section 11543.5 of the Business and Professions
Code.' 20  Section 11543.5 is part of the Subdivision Map Act con-
cerning regulation of drainage and sewer systems, and provides that
fees may be exacted, as a condition to approval of final subdivision
maps, to defray the costs of constructing sewers and drainage facilities.
However, this statute further provides that the fees must be fairly ap-
portioned within such areas either on the basis of benefits conferred or
on the need for such facilities created by the proposed subdivision.
Furthermore, the fee cannot exceed the pro rata share of the costs of
all such facilities. Finally, the fees must be paid into a "planned local
drainage facilities fund" and a "planned local sanitary sewer fund,"
and monies from such funds must be expended solely for the construc-
tion of local drainage or sanitary sewer facilities within the area from
which the fees comprising the fund were collected.12 7  Thus, section
11543.5 is a statutory embodiment of the need/benefit theory previ-
ously discussed-that there be a direct relationship between the ex-
action and the need and a like relationship between the exaction and
the benefit. This theory has been adopted by courts in other jurisdic-
tions as judicial justification for the constitutionality of exactions for
parks and schools.' 28 Of even greater significance, however, is that
the proposed statute for dedication for parks contained in the committee
report was an exact copy of section 11543.5, except for necessary sub-
stitution of certain words to make the statute apply to parks rather than
sewers.129
123. 1965 Report, supra note 120, at 36.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 39.
126. Id. at 43-45.
127. Id.
128. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
129. 1965 Report, supra note 120, at 43-44.
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By failing to interpret the words "serve" and "reasonable relation-
ship" as had been intended by the legislature, the court in Associated
impliedly rejected any judicial formulation relating the exaction to the
benefit conferred on the subdivision or relating the exaction to a com-
bination of need and benefit. This result taken together with the court's
rejection of the correlative need theory established in Pioneer placed
the court in Associated in approximately the same position as the New
York court in Jenad"3 ° that required only an incidental relationship to
justify the exaction. Under this formulation municipalities use land
developers to solve some of the cities' general fiscal problems. This
result, of course, would appear to be contrary to the legislative intent as
evidenced by the legislative history of section 11546.
At one point in its opinion, the court in Associated compared
parks with streets, sewers and drainage facilities and decided that all
were related to public health, safety and welfare.131 The court thus
did not distinguish parks from other subdivision exactions in deter-
mining whether exactions for park purposes could be justified under
the police power. However, the court completely disregarded the leg-
islative treatment of the method used in these other exactions in Cali-
fornia when it determined the validity of section 11546. As previously
noted, the provisions concerning regulation of drainage and sewer
systems contained in section 11543.5 of the Business and Professions
Code are much more rigorous than are the provisions of section 11546.
Section 11543.5 allows exaction of fees for drainage systems if, but
only if, the fees are prorated to the subdivision based on the need
generated and are utilized solely for the benefit of the subdivision.132
Also, sections 11543 and 11544 of the Business and Professions Code
make provisions for reimbursement to a developer if he agrees to con-
struct a drainage or sanitary sewer outside of the subdivision. Section
11525.2 of the Business and Professions Code provides authority for
requiring developers to dedicate land for schools, but also provides for
complete reimbursement to the developer for the land dedicated. Sec-
tions 11610.5 and 11610.7 of the Business and Professions Code au-
thorize exactions for access to coastlines or lakefronts from develop-
ers, but exempts such requirements if there is other reasonable access
available. No such reimbursement or exemption provisions are made
in section 11546 in the event that sufficient park facilities are already
available in the municipality. There is also no provision in section
11546 restricting the dedication of land or payment of fees to only those
requirements generated by creation of the subdivision. Nor is there
any provision that the exaction be used for the direct benefit of the sub-
130. Discussed in text accompanying notes 79-90 supra.
131. See discussion of first argument in note 92 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
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division. There is only the requirement that the park facilities serve
the subdivision and bear a reasonable relationship to use by the sub-
division residents. It is readily apparent that the court's construction
of section 11546 is an aberration in the legislative scheme for regulating
subdivisions and establishes an entirely new, different, and much
broader, standard concerning the constitutionally permissible limits
which may be placed on subdivision exactions.
Discrimination Against Subdividers
Two other arguments presented by the plaintiff are only tangen-
tially related to the arguments previously discussed, but are worthy of
a separate analysis. These arguments involved the arbitrary and dis-
criminatory nature of section 11546 and the Walnut Creek legislation.
The plaintiff first argued that section 11546 arbitrarily affected
only subdividers and did not apply to other land developers such as
apartment house builders. The plaintiff urged that it was unfair to re-
quire a subdivider to pay for a park while excluding a developer of
an apartment building from contributing to the park, because the
residents of the apartment building might live the same distance
from the park and have the same right to use the facilities. The court
rejected the plaintiffs argument and pointed out that the legislature
could have assumed that apartment houses consumed considerably less
open space land and that this distinction justified separate treatment. 133
The court's statement attributes a legislative intent which cannot
be supported by the legislative history of section 11546. As previously
discussed, the committee report on which section 11546 was based
discussed the need for parks only in terms of the requirement gener-
ated by subdivisions. 34  In fact, a more recent committee report has
recommended that the provisions of section 11546 be extended to apart-
ment houses.'3 5 A far more plausible assumption as to the legislative
133. 4 Cal. 3d at 642-43, 484 P.2d at 614, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
134. 1965 Report, supra note 120.
135. While Associated was being litigated in the courts, the interim committee
report on which section 11546 was based became final. It had three recommenda-
tions with respect to dedication for parks as follows: "Recommendation Number 19.
The Subdivision Map Act should be amended to: A. Require cities and counties to
require dedication of land or levy fees in lieu of dedication which they are now per-
mitted to require or levy by Section 11546 of the Business and Professions Code.
B. Permit such land and fees to be used for open space purposes other than parks and
recreation. C. Require cities and counties to demand fees as a condition to granting
a residential building permit for multiple dwellings of four or more units where such
fees have not been paid in connection with the approval of a subdivision map." Final
Report of the California Legislature Joint Comm. on Open Space Land 15, 35 (1970),
in 1 APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE (1970). Recommenda-
tion 19A is under consideration in A.B. 1564, Cal. Legis. Reg. Sess. (1971). Recom-
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intent is that, at the time section 11546 was being considered, the leg-
islature had not considered the matter of discrimination at all, and it
has now seen the inherent inequities in the statute and recommended
that it be changed.1 36
The plaintiff raised a similar contention against section 10-1.516
of the Walnut Creek Municipal Code, and argued that the fees were
determined arbitrarily and without reasonable relationship to principles
of equality. A hypothetical example was presented by the plaintiff in
which a developer who subdivides, into 100 lots, twenty-five acres val-
ued at $20,000 an acre, was compared to a developer who also subdi-
vides, into 100 lots, fifty acres worth $10,000 an acre. The city ordi-
nance assumes four occupants to each single family home, and there-
fore each subdivider brings in 400 new residents and each is required to
dedicate one acre or its cash equivalent. The cash equivalent for the
first subdivider would be $20,000 and for the second would be
$10,000.
The court met the plaintiff's argument by arbitrarily assuming that
residents in high-density areas would use the facilities more consistently
than residents in single family homes with backyards readily available,
and on this basis reasoned that it was not inequitable to require the
former to pay more.'37 The court's analysis may be sound as far as it
goes; however, compare the first developer in the hypothetical example
with a developer who decided to build duplexes on his twenty-five acre
subdivision worth the same $20,000 an acre (duplexes also come within
the provisions of the Subdivision Map Act). Under section 10-1.516 of
the Walnut Creek Municipal Code, duplexes are classified in the manner
of low density apartments which have an assumed density of 2-1/2
persons per dwelling unit. 3 " The developer of duplexes is required to
dedicate only one acre for every 160 dwelling units. 139 The first devel-
oper will have 400 people in 100 dwelling units on 100 lots. The du-
plex developer will have 400 people in 100 dwelling units on only 50
lots (each lot twice the size of a lot used by the first developer). There-
fore, each subdivision would take up twenty-five acres of land and
would add 400 new residents, yet the first subdivider would be re-
quired to dedicate one full acre or $20,000, while the duplex devel-
mendations 19B and 19C are under consideration in A.B. 1375, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.
(1971), which is under consideration to completely replace the current Subdivision Map
Act. Apartment houses are still exempt from its provisions under section 66413, but
the sections on dedication or reservation of land have been combined and expanded.
Sections 66477, 66479 and 66482 provide for reservation, dedication or in lieu fees for
parks, recreational facilities, school sites, fire stations, libraries, or other public uses.
136. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 1, at 1145-46 & n.104.
137. 4 Cal. 3d at 645 & n.14, 484 P.2d at 616 & n.14, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640 & n.14.
138. Walnut Creek, Cal., Res. 2225, at 2 (1967).
139. Id.
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oper would only be required to dedicate 5/8 of an acre or $12,500
under the Walnut Creek formula. The density is the same in both
cases (400 persons per twenty-five acres) so the court's assumption of
more consistent use by residents in higher density areas would not ap-
ply. Yet examples such as this eluded the court's consideration when
it held that the city's ordinance was not discriminatory.
Also, the court's assumption that residents in high density areas
would make more consistent use of the park facilities than would resi-
dents in single-family homes, which was given as justification for allow-
ing exactions from subdividers, could logically be extended to residents
of apartment houses. Apartment house residents would certainly have
a greater need to use the park facilities more consistently than either
residents of low density one-family houses or residents of high density
areas because there are no backyards in apartments. The plaintiff
posed the situation where a proposed park was equidistant from a sub-
division and an apartment house development. Under these circum-
stances, the court's assumption of greater use by residents in higher
density areas would result in the developer, or more properly, the fu-
ture residents of the subdivision, paying for a park used primarily by
residents of an adjacent apartment building. 40 The court apparently
felt that arguments such as the ones developed in this section had no
merit and did not disclose unconstitutional discrimination.
Conclusions Regarding the Correctness of Associated
Of the four approaches discernible in the case law concerning sub-
division exactions, the Supreme Court of California has chosen to re-
ject the more specific criteria used in most jurisdictions. The weight
of authority in the country insofar as permissible subdivision exactions
are concerned requires a relationship between the exaction and the
need, the exaction and the benefit conferred on the subdivision, or a
140. Other possibilities for abuse are inherent in this decision. As Justice
Holmes once noted: "The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment pre-
supposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such
use without compensation. . . When this seemingly absolute protection is found to
be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property disappears." Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also People ex rel. The Exch.
Nat'l Bank v. City of Lake Forest, 40 Ill. 2d 281, 239 N.E.2d 819 (1968) (city could
not require dedication for street because it only benefited adjacent subdivision); East
Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1969)
(confiscatory to require dedication of land worth $90,000 out of whole parcel worth
$208,000); Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 23 N.J. 357, 129 A.2d 265 (1957)
(excessive fees collected for building inspection that were used to defray general gov-
ernment costs held invalid); cf. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power:
The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 59-60 (1970).
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combination of both the need and the benefit as the judicial theory upon
which exaction statutes purporting to regulate the use of land are tested.
In contrast, New York, perhaps compelled by the same population and
land pressures as are present in California, has chosen not to adopt any
of these formulations and instead has adopted what has been described
above as the "incidental need" theory.
The court in Associated did not state any specific formulation or
theory of its own but appears to have adopted a position similar to the
position taken by the New York Court of Appeals in Jenad where only
an incidental relationship between the need and the exaction was re-
quired to justify an exaction. A careful reading of the legislative his-
tory indicates that the court's formulation runs counter to the legis-
lative intent in enacting section 11546. The net effect of Associated
is to establish a judicial policy that countenances exactions in excess of
the needs generated by the subdivision or the benefit conferred on it
without encountering any constitutional barriers. This decision allows
municipalities to partially solve local fiscal problems, using section
11546 as a vehicle to require developers to bear the burden of costs
which are necessitated by the growth of the community as a whole and
not just the activity of the subdivider.
Even under the tremendous land pressures that presently exist,
there would appear to be no real need to establish such a policy in order
to provide adequate park and recreation facilities for an expanding pop-
ulation. Cost accounting techniques are readily available to determine
the costs of a facility necessitated by a developer and would not place
an undue burden on municipalities. This approach would afford pro-
tection to the developer as well as the municipality so that neither bears
the burden of the costs generated by the other. Furthermore, an ele-
ment of discretion is inherent in any judicial formula, as the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin observed in Jordan, to keep the burden of the
municipality to a minimum. A judicial test relating the exaction to the
need and the exaction to the benefit would appear to be most preferable
because it would keep subdivision exactions within the scope of regula-
tion and not leave them open to possible abuse as the decision in Asso-
ciated may have done for section 11546.
This note has attempted to elucidate certain weaknesses in the au-
thority and reasoning on which Associated was based. The early Cali-
fornia case, Ayers, is distinguishable authority; the legislative history on
which section 11546 is based points to an opposite conclusion than was
reached by the court; and the majority of decisions in the country are
contrary to the decision in Associated. Even though the holding of the
case was that section 11546 was constitutional, the court's interpre-
tative language enunciated a very broad judicial standard of permissi-
ble exactions in California and there is a distinct possibility that cities
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may take advantage of this means of lessening some of their general fi-
nancial burden. However, the ultimate scope of permissible exactions
will have to await subsequent decisions when the newly broadened in-
terpretation of section 11546 is applied to a specific developer.
James P. Barber*
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